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Abstract
The adverse-selection literature has only considered the case in which
competing sellers costs of supply are independent and privately known
by the individual sellers. In contrast, the auction literature has ignored
adverse selection by implicitly assuming that a bid-taker is indi¤erent be-
tween suppliers at a given price. We show that competition in auctions
with common-value elements serves to magnify the impact of adverse se-
lection, as a bidder supplying a higher-cost product rationally makes a
heightened winners curse correction in a procurement auction. Hence
lower-cost suppliers are disproportionately likely to win the auction, po-
tentially creating a more serious quality problem for the procurer than
mainstream adverse-selection models suggest.
1 Introduction
We illustrate the interaction between two phenomena that have largely been
studied disjointly, but often arise together. The rst is adverse selection, for ex-
ample, situations in which competing potential suppliers with similar observable
characteristics nonetheless will di¤er substantially in the quality of the commod-
ity or service supplied.1 In these situations, an o¤er which is acceptable to a
high-quality supplier (i.e., a supplier who knows privately that he will provide
high quality) would be even more attractive to a low-quality type. The prob-
lem is kept interesting by assuming that quality cannot be veried by a neutral
third party and hence cannot be contracted. The procurer may do best o¤ering
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1Such approaches as prequalifying suppliers or providing more detailed specications pre-
sumably may ease, but do not solve, the problem under study.
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di¤erent prices for di¤erent quality specications with the specications for the
high price intolerably onerous to a low-quality supplier. These models have as-
sumed, often unrealistically, that neither type of supplier is uncertain about his
own costs of supply (La¤ont & Tirole,1987; McAfee & McMillan,1986,1987b;
Riordan & Sappington,1987; Vickrey,1961).
The second phenomenon is the winners curse. Auction models have an al-
together distinct interpretation of types, in which di¤erent types are competing
suppliers with di¤erent estimates of the costs of fullling a contractual commit-
ment. In many important markets, biddersuncertain costs and their estimates
of these costs are statistically related. Hence, bidders must take into account
the winners cursethe impact on appropriate cost estimation of the likelihood
that losing bidders had information suggesting higher costs than the winning
bidders estimate. However, auction models have assumed, often unrealistically,
that all bidders were competing to supply the same quality of product or service,
in that the buyer has been presumed indi¤erent between any two suppliers who
bid the same price (Rothkopf, 1969; Wilson, 1977; Milgrom & Weber, 1982;
McAfee & McMillan, 1987a; Milgrom, 1989; Riley, 1989; Wilson, 1992.).
Thus, the adverse-selection literature generally ignores supplier uncertainty
about their costs but recognizes possible di¤erences in quality provided by dif-
ferent suppliers. The winners curse literature recognizes supplierscost uncer-
tainties but ignores cost-related quality di¤erences across suppliers. The infor-
mational asymmetries considered in isolation in each of these literatures must
be combined to model situations like the following: Consider a buyer seeking
to obtain some service or product2 from one of a group of competing bidders.
Quality di¤erences across bidders give the buyer non-price reasons to have pref-
erences among them, but the traditional assumption will be maintained here:
the suppliers providing preferred quality levels cannot be identied by the buyer
unless predictable di¤erences in behavior across supplier types can be inferred.
Indeed, a suppliers quality level will be his own private information, also un-
known to rival bidders. In practice, a variety of sources of information for
inferences about quality levels would be available to the buyer, from prior ex-
perience, the grapevine, etc. Consistent with our focus (and with the tradition
in the adverse-selection literature), sources of information other than the bids
submitted are ignored here.
Similarly, for focus, suppliers are not allowed to choose the quality level that
will be supplied, thereby setting aside moral hazard issues. Each supplier simply
has his own technology of contract fulllment; a preferred-quality supplier nat-
urally incurs a higher cost. This assumption ts most neatly situations where
quality was set by capital investment decisions that were determined in the past
without reference to the preferences of this particular procurer.
Suppliersquality levels are modeled as independently drawn, from a dis-
tribution that is assumed commonly known. However, suppliers face uncertain
costs of contract fulllment. In the tradition of common-value models, suppliers
2We avoid distinguishing between goods and services by referring to a contractwith a
supplier.
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cost estimates are not independent; such sources of uncertainty as weather, raw
materials price shifts, future labor market tightness, and subcontract disruption
probabilities are common to all competing suppliers.3
The procurement problem that results in this model could be treated as a
problem in multi-dimensional mechanism design. To do so, we believe, would
be to overindulge in the assumption that the buyer knows the distributions of
bidders private information, and to obscure the interaction between adverse
selection and the winners curse. We consider the sort of allocation mechanism
common in markets, where bidders compete in a single dimension, price. We
nd that the presence of adverse selection magnies winners curse corrections.
A straightforward intuition underlies the magnication e¤ect. Even if a bid-
ders cost estimate were unbiased ex ante, he needs to make a winners curse
correction: his cost estimate will no longer be unbiased if he wins, as winning
will imply a lower bound on the cost estimates of losing bidders. In equilibrium,
all bidders make such winners curse corrections. This implies that a bidder
with a higher-cost technology knows that he will only win if all rivals with
lower-cost technologies are su¢ ciently more pessimistic about contract fulll-
ment costs than he is. Consequently, if he wins the bid, he may have seriously
underestimated his costs. Understanding the di¤erential magnitude of his po-
tential winners curse e¤ect, he will rationally add a corrective premium to his
bid which is larger than the premium added by lower-cost bidders. As a re-
sult, the di¤erences between the bids of higher-cost and lower-cost suppliers is
greater than the cost di¤erences between their technologies. This magnication
e¤ect implies that lower-cost-technology bidders are disproportionately likely to
submit the lowest bid.
Elucidation of the magnication e¤ect is most transparent in a second-price
auction, analyzed here. Extension to an English auction is straightforward,
discussed at the end.
2 The Model
Competition to fulll an indivisible contract involves n bidders. Bidder is
qualitytype ti is his own private information. If a quality type t bidder wins
the auction and the second-lowest bid is p, his payo¤ is p   C    (t); here C
is the unknown common element to contract fulllment costs and  (t) is the
di¤erence in costs resulting from the type-specic technologies that introduce
quality di¤erences.4 The function is assumed increasing and di¤erentiable, with
 (0) normalized to 0. Each bidders quality type is assumed to be an indepen-
dent draw; without further loss of generality, this draw can be assumed to be
uniform on [0; 1]. Losing bidders have a 0 payo¤ regardless of type.
3The frequency with which such common cost uncertainties arise limits applicability of both
auction models and adverse-selection models that assume independently distributed private
information.
4Assuming these two cost terms to be additive is simply a convenient normalization, at no
loss of generality.
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Each bidder i privately observes a cost estimate Xi 2 X  [xL; xH ]  <+,
with fxL; xHg  X; X may be an interval or a nite set. It is convenient
to view Xi as an estimate of C, the cost he would have if he were quality
type 0. Conditional on C, the cost estimates X1; : : : ; Xn are independent and
identically distributed. Unconditionally, X1; : : : ; Xn are a¢ liated. Roughly, this
means that a higher value of any Xi makes higher values of C and of other Xjs
more likely; see Milgrom & Weber (1982) for a detailed discussion.5 A prior
distribution on C is assumed to be nonatomic and commonly known. Let the
support of this distribution be denoted [cL; cH ]  <+.
In the usual game-theoretic sense, bidder is type is two-dimensional:  i =
(xi; ti), his cost estimate and his quality type. The type space for a bidder is
then T = X [0; 1], with T= Tn. Let  = (1; : : : ; n) and let 	 be the measure
on T that generates a marginal  on T .
Consider a second-price auction. Strategies of bidder i are functions si :
T ! B, specifying that si (x; t) is the bid i submits when i observes estimate
Xi = x and is of quality type t; here B = [cL; pH ]  <+ is the set of permissible
bids, with pH = cH + 2 (1) for convenience.
3 A Price-Dependent Expected-Cost Function
Let the bid functions of bidders 2; : : : ; n be xed and assumed continuous and
increasing. Let bidder 1 be of type t and observe cost estimate X1 = x. Given
	 and the bid functions of rivals, the lowest rival bid will be a random variable,
W . Temporarily imagine that bidder 1 is informed of the realization W = w
before he makes his bid. Bidder 1 could then update his cost estimate based on
the knowledge that one rival (of unknown type) bid w, and all other rivals bid
higher. Let his updated cost estimate be denoted:
c (x;w; t) = E [C +  (t) jX1 = x;W = w] :
By construction, c is continuous, and trivially increasing in t. By a¢ liation, c is
increasing in x. We temporarily assert the natural property that c is increasing
in w. This assertion will be shown below to be justied in symmetric equilib-
rium. It is possible to bound the responsiveness of c() to w. Fix wL < cL; then
wL < c(x;wL; 0)  c(x;wL; t) 8t. Correspondingly, x wH > cH + (1); then
wH > c(x;wH ; 1)  c(x;wH ; t) 8t. Let b(x; t) be dened by
b (x; t) = c [x; b (x; t) ; t] : (1)
Given x; t, from the inequalities involving wL; wH , the intermediate value the-
orem implies there must exist a b satisfying (1). We claim such a b is unique.
To demonstrate this claim, x x; t; b satisfying (1), and consider a real number
" near 0. By a¢ liation,
sign [c (x+ "; b; t)  b] = sign ["] :
5Riley(1988) explains that the assumption that the Xi are strictly stochastically ordered
by C is nearly equivalent. It is equally suitable for our purposes.
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The intermediate value theorem implies a  (") so that b+ (") = c [x+ "; b+  (") ; t].
As c is increasing, sign [ (")] = sign ["]. As c is continuous,  (") can be made
arbitrarily close to zero by choosing " close enough to 0. This construction
implies
sign [c (x; b+  (") ; t)  b   (")] = sign [ (")] : (2)
Treating c(x; b; t) as a function of b, (2) implies that where it crosses the 45o line,
it crosses from above; hence b satisfying (1) is unique so (1) serves to specify a
well-dened function b : T ! B.
That b is increasing follows straightforwardly from increasingness of c. Let
(bx;bt)  (x; t), distinct; then c[bx; b(x; t);bt] > c[x; b(x; t); t] = b(x; t) implying
b(bx;bt) > b(x; t).
4 A Best-Response Function
Consider given strategies of rival bidders yielding a w for which w > c(x;w; t).
Then bidder 1s expected prot is zero if his bid is more than this w, and strictly
positive if his bid is less: he would win, be paid the second-lowest bid w, and
an estimate of his contract fulllment cost that correctly accounts for these
events would be c(x;w; t). For a w for which w < c(x;w; t), however, bidder 1s
expected prot is strictly negative if he wins. Thus if bidder 1 could observe w
before he bid, to bid c(x;w; t), that is, to bid b(x; t), would be a best response to
the prole of rival strategies yielding w. As b(x; t) is a best response among all
functions of x;w and t, it is necessarily a best response among all functions of x
and t, and the assumption that bidder 1 observed w before bidding is harmless
in equilibrium. The preceding argument has not depended in any way on the
identity of bidder 1.
5 The Magnication E¤ect
We analyze the model when all bidders submit the bid b(x; t). This would
appear to be a mutual best response, but the issue of equilibrium existence in
auciton models with multi-dimensional types is quite complex; to focus on the
interplay between adverse-selection and the winners curse, this issue is removed
to the last section.
This equilibrium extends a familiar characterization of second-price equilib-
ria in a¢ liated-values auction models: a bidder is submitting a bid equal to the
price at which he is indi¤erent between winning and losing in the event that he
ties for lowest bid.
In terms of the notation set up here, the magnication e¤ect corresponds to
the inequality bt := @b=@t > 
0(t). That is, bids increase faster than the increase
in costs due to an increase in types. To investigate this, dene
 (x; s; t) = E [C +  (s) jX1 = x;W = b (x; t)] :
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In contrast to (1),  isolates the equilibrium e¤ect on expected project cost of
the inferences about rivalscost estimates drawn from tying for lowest bid, as
a function of bidder 1s type. That is, with s xed, varying t merely varies the
lower bound on rivalsbids, and inuences the expectation solely through its
inuence on C. By construction,
 (x; s; t) =  (s) + E [CjX1 = x;W = b (x; t)] ;
and bt = 
0(t) + t. By a¢ liation, E [CjX1 = x;W = w] is increasing in w, so
t > 0, and thus bt > 
0(t).
Hence, in any equilibrium of the second-price auction with adverse-selection,
di¤erences in bids across types will exceed type-specic cost di¤erences. In other
words, cost di¤erences are magnied in bid di¤erences.
As a result, a relatively low-cost bidder is much more likely to win. If there
were no magnication, a type t bidder 1 would only outbid a type bt < t bidder
2 in the event 0 :=

X1 + bx (X1  X2) + (t) < X2 + (bt)	, with Pr [0] <
Pr [X1 < X2]. However, with the magnication of cost di¤erences,6 to a rst-
order approximation, the event in which bidder 1 outbids bidder 2 is
1 :=

X1 + bx (X1  X2) + (t) + t
 
t  bt < X2 + (bt)	 ;
so that Pr [1] < Pr [0].
6 The E¤ect of Increased Competition
Suppose the actual competition is only among the rstm  n bidders, with some
ad hoc bar on the remaining bidders allowing us to examine varying numbers
of bidders without having to adjust our underlying probability measure. An
implication of a¢ liation is Theorem 5 in Milgrom & Weber (1982):
h

fai; big1;n

:= E [Cjai  Xi  bi; i = 1; : : : ; n] is nondecreasing in all arguments.
If a¢ liation is semi-strict, cases in which ai < bi and yet h fails to be increasing
can be viewed as pathological.
Consider any realization of types t2; : : : ; tn; let i be the inverse bid function
specic to type ti: k =def b[i(k); ti]. Then, in the m-bidder auction, bidder 1s
conditioning event W = w becomes
m := fi(w)  Xi; i = 2; : : : ;m;xL  Xi; i = m+ 1; : : : ; ng
with one of the rstm 1 inequalities exact. The e¤ect of increasing the number
of bidders from bm < m tom is to make E[CjX1 = x;W = w] more responsive to
w, by (2). Thus t is an increasing function of m. The implication is then that,
for any xed di¤erence in costs, increasing the number of bidders exacerbates
the resulting bid di¤erences.
6Note that if costs were independent, as is assumed in most adverse selection models, t
would be zero and there would be no magnication e¤ect.
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7 E¢ ciency Implications
In the absence of correlated cost uncertainties, the Pr [1] above would be driven
to 0, as happens, for example, in the models of Gabor & Granger (1966), Gard-
ner (1971), Monroe (1973), Akerlof (1979), Leland (1979), Wolinsky (1983) and
Cooper & Ross (1984). The fact that Pr [1] is positive sharply illustrates the
richness of this model: auction outcomes reect bid magnications, but incom-
pletely. Here, a higher-cost-technology bidder has private information about
common cost uncertainties, which for nonpathological distributions yields posi-
tive equilibrium expected prot.
E¢ ciency analyses require a specication of the costs to the buyer of ob-
taining a lower-quality product. Let V + (t) be the value to the buyer of a
contract fullled in accordance with technology t; (t) is the buyers value of
the quality the seller brings to contract fulllment. There need not be any par-
ticular relationship between the orders of magnitude of (t) and (t) or their
respective responsiveness to t.7 Maskin (1992) and Goeree and O¤erman (2003)
have found that an e¢ cient allocation is not guaranteed when biddersprivate
information is multi-dimensional, but have not modeled a bid-taker as facing
adverse selection with qualityand thus e¢ ciencyconsequences.
Suppose that Pr[V + (0) > C + (1)] = 1, and that (t)   (t) is non-
constant, so that e¢ ciency requires the contract be fullled, and simply breaks
down to the nontrivial issue of whether the preferred type is likely to win the
auction. If 0(t) < 0(t) on (0; 1), then e¢ ciency is enhanced by the magni-
cation e¤ect; the buyer should be buying from the lowest-quality seller, who is
disproportionately likely to win the auction.
Adverse selection is usually thought, however, to have the opposite impli-
cation: that high-quality sellers would be the e¢ cient choice if they could be
discerned, which would result from 0(t) > 0(t) on (0; 1). In this case, the
magnication e¤ect is deleterious to e¢ ciency, as the preferred higher-quality
sellers are disproportionately less likely to win the auction. It is in this sense
that the prior literature on adverse selection may be said to have understated
the problem.
Recall that the magnication e¤ect increases with more bidders. If, as in
standard auction models, there is some number of bidders past which the ex-
pected price paid for the contract falls but slightly with further added competi-
tion, then it will pay the buyer to employ a credible precommitment to consider
only the rst m bids submitted. This is despite a restriction to anonymous
policies in the model; in practice, when a buyer has information external to the
auction about potential sellerstechnologies, and can inuence the identities of
the buyers given serious consideration, it is common to do so.
7Two examples: About a decade ago, an innovation in producing printer paper (adopted
by all major suppliers within about fteen months) reduced costs by nearly 10%; users were
said not to detect the quality deterioration. The cost di¤erence between a mirror on the
Hubble space telescope which had passed a skewness test and one which skipped that test
was reported to be less than $25,000; the di¤erence in value to NASA appears to have been
approximately one billion dollars.
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8 Relevance of Magnication for Other Auction
Forms
Consider an English auction, as that mechanism is modelled in Milgrom & We-
ber(1982). To maintain the viewpoint above, we continue to assume that bidders
are competing to sell, so the English auction takes an unfamiliar but logically
equivalent form: the price falls continuously from an initial price that is clearly
too high, while bidders can irrevocably exit if the price becomes unacceptably
low (i.e., when the contract price falls below their exit price) with the contract
being awarded to the last remaining bidder.8 As Milgrom & Weber demon-
strate, this auction consists of an initial phase in which the n  2 bidders with
the highest willingnesses-to-accept publicly reveal their exit prices, followed by
a second-price auction among the remaining two bidders, equipped with this
additional information. Hence, the above analysis implies that, at a minimum,
cost di¤erences between the nal two bidders are magnied in di¤erences in
their planned exit prices.9 In fact, a corresponding argument can be applied at
each state: planned exit prices of remaining bidders after k bidders have exited
magnify cost di¤erences.
First-price auctions are more complicated. Since an equilibrium bid function
in a second-price auction is a price at which the bidder is indi¤erent between
winning and losing, this price can be interpreted as an equilibrium willingness-
to-accept. A bidder who bid as low as his willingness-to-accept in a rst-price
auction could not hope to prot. His equilibrium bid adjusts upward from his
willingness-to-accept, continuing to increase his bid so long as the incremental
increase in his expected protability in the event that he wins, associated with
being paid more, exceeds the impact on his expected prot of winning incre-
mentally less often. Since di¤erences in costs are magnied in di¤erences in
willingness-to-accept, this incremental protability/probability tradeo¤ begins
with the magnication e¤ect already in place.10
8Herodotus reports the auctions for wives in ancient Greece sometimes took this form,
when a particular woman could only be wed if her family provided a dowry, and the family
wished the dowry payment to be minimized by auction competition (Cassady [1967]).
9There is reason to suspect that Milgrom & Webers analysis may well carry over to the
adverse selection case, implying that the buyers expected cost would be lower than for a
second-price auction. However the public information inferred from exit prices would have
much less impact. An exiting bidder would determine his exit price via a function b(x; t; p),
where p is the vector of earlier exit prices. While the function being used could be calculated,
the exit price would only allow inference of an iso-bid contour in (x; t) space. Only x would be
of interest to bidders still competing. Moreover remaining bidders could not be certain that
bidders exited in decreasing order of their cost estimates. A bidder would rationally update his
cost estimate by integrating across the iso-bid contour with respect to a density that reected
his current beliefs across types of the exiting bidder. However, these beliefs would di¤er from
the prior marginal across types, as they would rationally incorporate available information
about the probable rank-order of the exiting bidders cost estimate. A similar calculation is
discussed in Harstad & Rothkopf (2000,section 7). Their analysis suggests that the expected
contract fulllment cost for a second-price auction would be a good estimate of that for an
English auction.
10Let bidders 2; : : : ; n use increasing bid functions B. Consider the situation in which
two di¤erent quality types of bidder 1, tL < tH , determine a best response for di¤erent
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Hence adverse selection exacerbates winners curse corrections across a broad
range of auction types.
9 On Equilibrium
This section supplies information about the existence of equilibrium in the model
introduced here, and similar models. To our knowledge, the material provided
here has not been compiled in a single source.
The mathematical aspects of this model relevant to the existence of an equi-
librium correspond very closely to those in Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2000).
Their concern is with asymptotic e¢ ciency and asymptotic information aggre-
gation; their characterizationthat for any  > 0, there is a large enough num-
ber of bidders such that the function they analyze is within  of being a best
responseapplies to the b (x; t) function above. Their signals corresponding to x
are discretely distributed, those corresponding to t are continuously distributed.
Jackson (1999,2009) has provided an example auction in which multi-dimensional
private information yields a nonexistence theorem. His example is very close
to a variant of the model above when both types of private information are
drawn from discrete distributions and  (t) is the identity function. Jacksons
discussion indicates that his example does not readily extend to nonexistence of
equilibrium when both types of private information are nonatomic, but that he
is concerned that very similar issues arise.
Goeree and O¤erman (2003) nd an equilibrium for a quite similar model
that avoids Jacksons nonexistence problems. Their model has both signals
drawn from nonatomic distributions, has every signal (common and private)
drawn independently from every other random variable in the model, and achieves
a common-value element by assuming that the auctioned assets common value is
the average of the independent private estimates. They then nd an equilibrium
under the assumption that both signal distributions are log-concave (and that
 (t) is the identity function). Adapting our model to meet these assumptions
would be su¢ cient for their Proposition 2 (which establishes the equilibrium).
cost estimates xL > xH chosen so that both would have the same willingness to accept:
b0 := b(xL; tL) = b(xH ; tH). Now consider the impact upon expected prots of an increase in
the bid from  > b0 to  + d:
Pr [B (xj ; tj) > ; j = 2; : : : ; njX1 = x]  (   b0) Pr

 = min
j=2;:::;n
B (xj ; tj) jX1 = x

:
The rst term indicates the e¤ect of being paid incrementally more when bidder 1 still wins; the
second the e¤ect of winning incrementally less often. Notice that, with the same willingness-
to-accept, this expression depends on bidder 1s quality type only through the di¤erent signals
that would lead di¤erent quality types to have the same willingness-to-accept. For the ex-
pression to be larger for type tL than for type tH , for b0 < b  B(xH ; tH), would be su¢ cient
to imply that the magnication e¤ect is even greater for rst-price than for second-price auc-
tions. As xL > xH , a¢ liation implies that the rst term in the above expression is greater for
tL than for tH . Adverse selection has made the second term much more complicated than in
mainstream models. If the density of the lowest rival bid translates smoothly with increases
in X1, then the second term above is approximately the same size for tL and tH , so then the
well-behaved rst term dominates the expression.
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Tian (2009) provides a necessary and su¢ cient condition for existence of a
pure strategy equilibrium. If the condition is not satised for a given game,
the game has no equilibrium in pure strategies. While signicant, it does not
appear easy to determine whether this condition is satised or falsied in a game
of incomplete information, as is the case with our model.
The ability to demonstrate existence of an equilibrium in increasing pure
strategies has been greatly enhanced by Renys Theorem (2008), which di¤ers
from prior approaches by not requiring convexity of best responses. Since
his approach is quite di¤erent and in ways more promising, we outline the
relationship between this model and Renys results. Readers are referred to
Reny (2008), section 2 for denitions of terms used in the remainder of this
section.
Let S be the set of monotone strategies; that is, S is the set of monotone
functions mapping domain T into range B. For any (s0; s1) 2 S  S, dene the
metric
 (s0; s1) :=
Z
T
js0 ()  s1 ()j d () ;
let s = (s1; : : : ; sn), S = Sn, and treat (S; ) as a metric space. As it is straight-
forward to establish that (S; ) is closed and convex, it is an absolute retract.
The other key element to dene is the correspondence G : S! S of monotone
best responses. For any strategy prole s 2 S and any i = 1; : : : ; n, Gi (s) is the
subset of S consisting of all proles of monotone functions that are each best
responses to the prole of strategies s i of is rivals, i = 1; : : : ; n. Naturally,
G is nonempty-valued. Suppose any convergent sequence
n 
sk;bsk
k=1;2;:::
o
!
(&;b&), with  sk;bsk 2 S S and sk 2 G  bsk. It is straightforward that (&;b&) 2
S S. Renys approach can be used if & 2 G (b&); then G would be upper-
hemicontinuous. There is reason to doubt that & can be proven to lie in G (b&).
(An alternative to needing upper-hemicontinuity of G would be to treat the set
of permissible bids as a nite set. Then Renys Theorem 4.1 could be applied
directly, to show the existence of a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium.)
The key step to use Renys approach is to show that G is contractible-valued.
Fix strategies (s2; : : : ; sn) 2 Sn 1 and suppose s1 2 S and bs1 2 S are both best
responses to the xed prole s 1. Then it is clear that, for almost every type
 , if both s1 () and bs1 () are both expected-payo¤ maximizing responses for
player 1s type  , so is max fs1 () ; bs1 ()g. Hence images of G are join-closed,
and the mapping h in equation (6.1) in Reny (2008) is a contraction map for
any image of G.
The setup just outlined allows demonstrating existence of a monotone pure-
strategy equilibrium via Renys Theorem 2.1, which restated in terms of the
current notation is:
Theorem: Suppose that a compact metric space (S; ) is an absolute retract
and that G : S ! S is an upper hemicontinuous, nonempty-valued, contractible-
valued correspondence. Then G has a xed point.
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10 Concluding Remarks
If any of many common procurement situations are modeled via either a main-
stream common-value auction model or a standard adverse-selection model, the
model contains only part of the critical strategic elements. The interplay be-
tween the winners curse and adverse selection, illustrated here via the magni-
cation e¤ect, points to fundamental misconceptions and faulty prescriptions
that can arise in either model if analyzed separately. Markets where sales occur
through auctions or auction-like competitions can call for a similarly integrated
analysis if the sellers payo¤ is a¤ected by technological di¤erences among buyers
in ways not fully reected in revenue; one example among many is a government
auctioning airwaves rights without restricting the uses to which buyers may put
them.
A combined model cannot sensibly be much simpler than that introduced
here; nonetheless, the last section has pointed to serious complexities. Con-
fronting such complexities (at the probable sacrice of some mathematical el-
egance) is necessary if useful prescriptions are to arise (cf. Rothkopf and
Harstad,1994). This paper has but begun to point the way, partly by show-
ing that it means settling for smaller characterizations.
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